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DEAD STATUES—OR ALIVE?
Signs of Ambivalence in
Transition-Era Hungary
Gitta Hammarberg

I. Introduction
Tram #19, followed by bus #14 and then bus #50 will take you
from Clark Adám tér to Szobor Park on the Tétényi Plain at the
margins of Budapest. A similar route was taken by numerous
salvia plants, transplanted in their original red star formation to
Szobor Park from the centrally located Clark Adám tér now
graced by an abstract floral pattern of mostly yellow marigolds.
The red star is now the centerpiece of a project suggested in 1989
by a literary scholar László Szörényi and followed by a design
competition announced by the cultural committee of the
Budapest Assembly, won by the architectural firm Vadász &
Partners and their associate, Akos Eleöd. The resulting theme
park features an ensemble of sculptures celebrating former communist glory, relocated from different sites in Budapest. The
park opened in the fall of 1993 — still unfinished — and appears
as a latter-day Potemkin village with an austere oversize façade
of brick arches, pillars, and niches that make up an entry flanked
by the fathers of communist ideology, Lenin on the left and a
dual statue of Marx and Engels on the right.
The main gate is always closed. Visitors enter through a
smaller side gate and proceed through a low, narrow, and
oppressive passage. Once inside, the visitors find themselves on
the straight “one and indivisible path,” across which the numbered statues are distributed in the shape of three mathematical
infinity symbols (∞). The single path is symbolically intersected
by infinity. Larger-than-life-size communist role models are
221
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placed in a setting of the classical palace-cum-communist
baroque that defines socialist realism. The walls that were
designed to surround the ensemble were never built, and visitors can actually choose to bypass the intended entry path, just
as they can ignore the numbered sequence of statues and create
their own capricious viewing patterns. Is the lack of walls
simply a case of ubiquitous financial shortage, sloppy (postcommunist) workmanship, or a failed plan; or is it a sign of (noncommunist) openness? The visitor is set in an ambivalent frame
of mind, compounded by the museum catalogue’s presentation
of “before” views of statues in their original location, surrounded by cheering pioneers or austere honor guards, “intermediate” views of monuments being rededicated, mockingly
taken down, or desecrated before being carted off to the park.
The statues are both dead and alive.
II. Polyphonic Signs
The “signs” of the park’s openness/closure and the path’s singleness/infinity are akin to the (unintentional) irony in a verbal
sign used by one of our Hungarian guests: the Russian word
glasnost to indicate the Hungarian opening up of its formerly
closed society—to the West, one might add, but definitely not to
the East, as was repeatedly confirmed in our dialogues with
scholars. The temptation for binary, either/or thinking does not
work for the both/and situation in Hungary. It spans both East
and West, both communism and capitalism, while in a liminal
state of transition between them. Perhaps ambivalence is indeed
the essence of Hungarian identity. I will deconstruct Szobor
Park as a symbol of that ambivalence.
Szobor Park, in the architect’s opinion (as quoted in the
museum catalogue), is a statement about dictatorship. “And at
the same time,” he writes, “because it can be talked about,
described, built, this park is about democracy. After all, only
democracy is able to give the opportunity to let us think freely
about dictatorship. Or about democracy, come to that. Or about
anything.” To extend this reasoning to the current function of
the park, it is also about capitalism. It capitalizes on the artifacts
of former communist glory: as in Disneyland, a visitor is immediately faced with paying for views that were formerly free.
222
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Commercial displays encourage visitors to purchase a sealed tin
containing “The Last Breath of Communism,” or a perestroika
cookbook, featuring on its cover a red pastry shaped as a hammer and sickle, or a “tame” molotov cocktail, or miniature models of East German Trabant cars, no longer wanted on the
full-size car market. Shopping decisions are facilitated by rousing Hungarian socialist marches (also available on cassette),
playing through a 1950s vintage radio, turned off as one leaves
the premises. Communist glory has been placed next to capitalist kitsch, multimedia marketing, and is itself marketed as
leisure time entertainment for a fee. Unintended side effects
abound. As one looks back toward the entrance from inside the
park, the fathers of communism together with impressive power
lines of socialist electrification are competing with a large, colorful billboard advertising McDonald’s hamburgers for 59 forints
(69 forints for a cheeseburger). During my visit, a brand new
Saab was parked next to Lenin at the entrance. I found myself
wondering how the park might have influenced the property
values of the fairly well-to-do houses in the quiet XXII District.
The park and its context show the semiotic vacillation that
seems typical of today’s Hungary. Two (or more) differently
functioning semiotic systems contradict each other, overlap,
intertwine, conduct a dialogue, and invite a confused public to a
multiplicity of possible readings. Or a refusal to “read”: judging
from several visits to the park by members of our group, foreigners were the only visitors; Hungarians chose not to engage
in this form of re/deconstruction. Hungary is enjoying freedom
from the communist dominance, but freedom to what? It is of
course presumptuous for the West to offer ready-made solutions to Hungarians. Western democracy and capitalism have
their own often unforeseen problems and, in their pure forms,
risk veering into anarchy and chaos. Similarly, the new ideologically correct street signs replacing Május 1. utca with Kucsera
Ferenc u. or Felszabadulás tér with Ferenciek tére could easily
confuse drivers, were not the original signs left hanging in their
crossed-out versions. Erasure, but not quite erasure of the communist past. Defamiliarizing a familiar road. The West, but not
quite the West. Signs advertising a rock band named “Sex Epil”
to arouse (Western?) libidos, risk arousing linguistic amusement. T-shirts from “Michigan Pacific” might lead aspiring stu223
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dents to fantasy coasts or provoke chuckles from the geographically enlightened.
III. Signs and Antisigns
Some of the statues in Szobor Park have retained both their original message and subsequent graffiti. The original inscription
“With thanks to the Soviet Liberators for our freedom” on Barna
Megyeri’s 1948 Soviet Heroic Memorial is contradicted by the
superimposed graffiti antimessage: “Russians, go home!” Being
placed in the park, neither message is voided, but both are given
equal time and neither comprises the new message. The park
continues to be controversial since, on the one hand, the former
communist heroes are again standing, and, on the other, they
have been deposed and, so to speak, marginalized (and, one
could even say, forcibly collectivized) and placed in a context of
kitsch and commercialism. Eleöd himself, according to the
museum catalogue, approached his task as a “delicate matter”
that he tried to treat with seriousness:
I had to realize that if I constructed this park with more tendentious extreme or realistic methods — as a number of people were
expecting — I would ultimately be doing nothing more than constructing my own Antipropaganda park from these propagandist
statues, and following the same thought patterns and prescriptions of dictatorship that erected these statues in the first place.

One of the greatest dangers, as correctly perceived by the
architect, is to substitute a sign with its antithesis, a former plussign with a minus-sign, thereby still expressing the identical
prescriptive ideology. However, such an extreme form of
either/or thinking is tempting. As argued by many of our seminar speakers, such a solution, though shortsighted, seems to be
quite prevalent, despite its tendency to backfire, or to have
entirely unexpected consequences. In one of his one-minute stories, “Public Opinion Survey,” the popular Hungarian absurdist
writer István Örkény (1912 – 79) captures the situation perfectly.
A questionnaire contains several multiple-answer questions that
tend to start with a statement, immediately followed by its
opposite, only to conclude in unexpected absurdities. For exam-
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ple, the proffered choices regarding the repondent’s philosophical orientation are (a) Marxism, (b) anti-Marxism, (c) science fiction, and (d) alcoholism. The options for opinions about the
current regime are (a) favorable, (b) unfavorable, (c) neither
favorable nor unfavorable but a little improvement would not
hurt, and (d) I want to move to Vienna.1 The replacement in the
government of the former communists with the opposition (be it
the Polish Solidarity, the Hungarian Free Democrats, or the
Czech Civic Forum) and the subsequent disillusion with or
replacement of the new leaders, speaks to a similar dilemma. As
is literally the case in the park, “Lenin is still with us” mentally
as well, as shown by Dr. Enik"o Bollobás’s description of a shortterm euphoria over the new freedom that rapidly gave way to
the old mentalities’ resistance to new possibilities.
IV. Recycled Signs
The Chain Bridge over the Danube is hardly changed physically
by the canvas now covering what looks like communist stars.
Parts of a sign can be almost imperceptibly altered but the
meaning of the whole changes radically. Such symbolical
changes often affect the most prominently placed memorials.
Among the statues in Szobor Park is Zsigmond Kisfaludi
Strobl’s 6-meter bronze statue of a Soviet soldier holding a red
banner, which was formerly part of “The Liberation Monument.” The statue was commissioned by the Soviet Marshall
Voroshilov, who liberated Budapest after WWII. However,
many believe that it was intended as a memorial to István Horthy, the older son of Hungary’s interwar dictator, who was
killed in action fighting the Russians in 1944 (and the artist had
indeed planned such a memorial too). Formerly it (whatever
version one chooses to believe) stood flanking the “Genius of
Freedom” — a 13.5-meter-tall woman holding a palm frond in
her raised hands, on top of a 22-meter-tall obelisk prominently
standing on top of Gellért Hill, visible from almost anywhere in
Budapest. The question of the soldier sculpture’s identity was
not the only dispute concerning the monument: it was toppled
during the 1956 revolt — only to be replaced in 1958 by an
absolutely identical version. In 1992 the woman herself was
wrapped in a white veil as part of a yet different cultural cele225
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bration and thereby symbolically transformed into “The Spirit
[rather than Genius] of [the new] Freedom.” The same signifier
(or identical versions of it) could signal several contradictory
signifieds by the magic of symbolic acts. Another example of a
minor change in symbols is found on the 1,000-forint bill, where
the old red star surrounded with socialist heraldry in an understated pinkish center has almost imperceptibly faded into a new
pink center featuring St. Stephen’s crown. Some unintentional
ironies occur as the large portrait flanking the center remains
intact: Béla Bartók, who (together with the numerical value of
the new bill) seems to transcend political vagaries.
What do such symbols and symbolic actions mean, besides
ideological transition? Do they speak to the resilience of memorized symbols, or to the ease of reinventing past traditions? Do
they indicate that good art prevails, or that art is in the mind of
the beholder, or, on a more practical level, that the state will no
longer subsidize new public art? And what about the other arts?
At first glance, Hungarian theatre seems to thrive. Marvelously creative avant-garde productions, such as A Midsummer Night’s Dream, draw packed houses. Originally a production
of the Merlin Theatre, it was, for various reasons, relocated in an
intimate open-air summer theatre in Szentendre, where the
audience was seated on swings at various heights around and
above the stage — the stage, also equipped with its own swings,
as part of the play. The play, which itself contains a play,
became enveloped in yet a larger play that we were all acting
out. The Hungarian-speaking public was roaring with laughter
at what presumably included topical references to an oscillating
Hungarian midnight. However, even those of us (reasonably
familiar with the play) who did not understand the Hungarian
dialogue, found the comic acting as well as the innovative staging outstanding. This leads me to conclude that the success of
this play was mainly due to aesthetic merit, or at least not limited to whatever political messages might have been inserted
between the lines. This play is a sign of hope for the future of
Hungarian theatre, one among several successes in experimental theatre. Hungarian theatre as a whole is, however, faced with
deep problems.
According to László Magács of the Merlin Theatre, one of the
main problems today stems from the role of the theatre in pre226
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1989 Hungary as the main forum for protest against the communist oppression. As in the Soviet Union, oppression fostered special skills among writers and readers in writing/reading
between the lines, usually referred to as “Aesopian language,”
or inspired them to turn to other indirect means of social criticism, such as the absurd. In Hungarian literature the absurd
humor of Örkény (akin to the Russian Oberiu of the 1920s and
1930s), for example, served to cope with an oppressive system
by carnivalizing it, to use the term given currency by M. M.
Bakhtin.2 Örkény not only survived the strict censorship laws,
but became immensely popular. According to Magács, such
“Aesopian” skills have now become obsolete, a loss that so far
tends to impoverish theatre. It is not, perhaps, surprising that
despite Örkény’s popularity both in Hungary and abroad (the
first English edition of his One Minute Stories, published in 1994,
was already sold out in all the bookstores in Budapest), no
Örkény school has developed in Hungary, according to his
translator, Judith Sollosy.
There is a deep irony in the fact that censorship (with all its
complex implications, mostly negative) implies a tacit admission of the power of art. In communist societies, the arts and
artists were liberally supported by state patronage. With censorship gone and open criticism possible, the arts can presumably
once again return to aesthetic criteria, to creative artistic innovation. According to Magács, this has not yet happened in Hungarian theatre. The comfort of continuing the old
pseudo-Stanislavsky realistic-naturalistic approach still stands
in the way of new talent finding expression on Hungarian
stages. The decline in the quality of the National Theatre with
the exodus of promising young talent, seems a sad example of
recycling old approaches that does not work in a new context of
artistic freedom. Presumably the same is happening in literature. New aesthetic directions have yet to capitalize on the new
freedoms. Part of the problem is that the disappearance of state
censorship was accompanied by the disappearance (or at least
severe curtailment) of state support of arts and artists. One
might also ask whether censorship has in fact disappeared. Is it
not possible that the new free market forces impose something
very similar on artists who wish to be successful? It might be
tempting for an artist to let aesthetic criteria become secondary
227
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to market demands and to produce literary bestsellers or plays
that cater to mass audiences or well-heeled foreign tourists.
Surely the postmodern free market in the West has produced a
glut of artistically (and intellectually) inferior art, together with
artistically and intellectually complacent consumers. So far the
new free market in Hungary indeed seems to demand mostly
what the Hungarians refer to as limonada: (mostly Western) pulp
fiction (romances, detective stories, etc.) and TV programs in the
soap-opera range, or, among more intellectually oriented consumers, translations and editions of (mainly Western) works,
previously unavailable. It is clearly too early to tell how the
“freedom to” will be redefined in the arts. What will replace traditional approaches? What will replace the subversive joy of
Aesopian language? How will the artistic intelligentsia redefine
itself and will the arts regain their former prestige (or snob
appeal—depending on one’s perspective)? Perhaps the influx of
popular mass culture may in the long run prove beneficial for
setting new aesthetic standards, as will no doubt the increased
exposure to artistic developments abroad, the globalization of
the arts. As was obvious to our group, there is an abundance of
artistic talent in Hungary waiting for an outlet.
V. Signs of National Nonidentity
From most of our encounters with Hungarians (and other Central Europeans) it became overwhelmingly clear that they were
eager to be identified with the West, but perhaps even more
eager to be distanced from the East. The idea of the East is, of
course, a cultural construct that seems to recede the farther east
one travels. To the Hungarians in general, the unpalatable East
seems to signify just about anything non-West European: the
Ottoman Turkish Empire, the former Soviet Union, and now
countries east of Hungary, from Romania to Ukraine to Russia.
However, anything still farther east exists as some diffuse and
irrelevant region that even the intelligentsia felt comfortable
ignoring, as did Dr. Rudolf Andorka when asked about the viability of the “Asian tiger” model (as an alternative to Western
ones) for Hungarian economic recovery. Hungarian history is
interpreted as a series of Westernization attempts, each followed
by a setback into something “Asiatic.” For instance, with the
228
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Ottoman conquest, Hungary fell back into a non-Western state
of (non)civilization, “almost Asiatic,” after having been an integral part of Western civilization. When Andorka was pressed
for further elaboration of the Hungarian perception of “Asiatic,”
it became clear that its pejorative sense is now most closely associated with “Soviet/Russian.” The “Asiatic-Russian” stereotype
was explained with images such as “uncivilized, stupid, with no
idea of how to behave, soldiers raping Hungarian women and
wearing twenty looted watches on their arms.” Two ethnic anecdotes further emphasized the stereotype he was trying to
describe. In 1945 a young Hungarian boy saw a Russian soldier
drowning. He alerted a guard, who responded: “There are
enough people [Russians] left.” The numerousness of the “Asiatic hordes” is also implied in a second anecdote about Brezhnev (a notoriously bad marksman) hunting with Kádár. One of
the drivers, fearing for his life, asks Kádár whether they should
tell Brezhnev that there are only 10 million of us [Hungarians].
The identification of Russia with an untold number of “Asiatics” is by no means new, or even exclusively Hungarian. Nor is
Hungary the only nation that is proud of having saved [the rest
of] Western Europe from barbaric Eastern invasions. Russians
themselves have frequently appropriated identical imagery,
converting the unflattering “Asiatic” label into a symbol of brute
strength and future world leadership — one need only think of
Vladimir Soloviev’s “Panmongolism” or the mystical cult of
“Scythianism” around the turn of the last century. A 1918 poem
of revolutionary fraternal fervor by the Russian symbolist poet
Aleksandr Blok (1880 – 1921), The Scythians, might indeed have
been quoted by Andorka to render the “Asiatic-Russian” stereotype. “Da, skify — my! Da, aziaty — my! / S raskosymi i zhadnymi ochami!” “Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we are Asiatics, /
With slit and greedy eyes!” proclaims Blok, using images such
as “our” far greater number than the mere millions of Europeans, “our” infinite capacities, “our” love for raw flesh, its
taste, color, and stench, “our” Asiatic maws and paws, “our”
capacity to break in wild steeds and to subjugate captive maidens to gratify “our” lusts. He invites the West to join Russia in
fraternal embraces — or else “we” will no longer save “you”
from “the savage Mongol Horde” or “attacks by the Huns.”3
One senses a certain ambivalence in Hungarian self-identifica229
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tion. On the one hand, today’s fraternal invitations seem to be
ignored by Hungarians who lack faith in “Asiatic” strength or a
future that looks to Russia. On the other hand, Hungarian selfidentification in some ways echoes traditional Russian self-identification as a shield against the East.
Russians in today’s Hungary are seen as “strangers,” and
Hungarians choose to ignore that today’s Russia is every bit as
Western-aspiring and eager to be part of Europe as is Hungary.
The question of whether Hungarian identity resides in a negation of the “Soviet” or “Communist” or “Russian” shades of
their past, or whether all variants are seen as equally odious
(“Asiatic”) has no simple answer. Andorka presented what
seems a fairly typical view: communism is about 70 percent Russia and 30 percent Marx, implying that the older Russian system
was simply transformed into a Leninist-Bolshevik system. The
best term to describe what the Hungarians try to distance themselves from, in his view, is totalitarianism. Whether tsarist Russia was more or less totalitarian than the Soviet Union seems a
moot point. Thus attitudes toward Szobor Park, a symbol of a
rejected Soviet-inspired ideology, also reflect the current
ambivalence toward Russia.
Hungarian attitudes toward the Russian language today provide another sign of the generally negative attitude toward Russia. Knowing full well that Hungarians, previously forced to
learn Russian in school, might be likely not to speak Russian, I
was nevertheless surprised at how useless Russian is in Hungary today. For the most part, even older-generation Hungarians would respond with incomprehension or silence when
addressed in Russian, either on principle or because they really
never mastered the language of the oppressor, and always chose
a Western linguistic orientation. When I asked Hungarians
about the presence/value of Russian language and culture in
general, or specifically about the desirability of Russian markets
for goods such as the formerly eastward-bound Hungarian
Ikarus buses, the responses were mostly negative. At best, reactions to Russia were mixed, subtracting, as it were, the Soviet
stratum from the truly great Russian culture that is still revered.
Andorka, together with many other intellectuals, voiced his
admiration for Russian (non-socialist realist) high culture and a
sympathy for Russian intellectual exiles. Tolstoy and Dosto230
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evsky are still being read, although Western literature from
Danielle Steel to David Hume, from James Herriott to L. Ron
Hubbard, from Faulkner to Follett is much more widely displayed on bookstands than anything Russian. Chekhov’s plays
have been staged without interruption in Hungary and are still
regularly performed, together with plays by Gogol and certain
formerly forbidden Russian playwrights such as Mikhail Bulgakov, but they can hardly compete with televised Western pop
culture. On the level of folk culture, Palekh lacquer boxes and
Russian nesting matrioshka dolls vie for the tourists’ attention
with native Hungarian folk-crafts, often next to displays of
Soviet military insignia, army belts, and officers’ caps and uniforms. Just as Hungarians probably do not visit Szobor Park,
they probably also do not buy such items, but nevertheless seem
eager (or desperate enough?) to profit from their residual value
as representing the exotic Other.
VI. Signs of National Identity—the Other Side
The fact that Russian classics are still respected does not signal a
love for things Russian, but more probably their canonization as
part of Western world culture. At a certain level of achievement,
nationality does not seem to matter. In more everyday contacts I
sensed that anti-Russian sentiment is common — and understandable, if not excusable. I raised the question of the current
Hungarian perception of Russians with the director of the Russian Cultural Center in Budapest, Gleb Borisovich Vyshinskii. He
conceded that Hungarians have developed a certain “allergy” to
Russians, but was convinced that such an “allergy” was of a
temporary rather than chronic nature: soon enough the Hungarians will see the wisdom of turning to Eastern markets (as Western markets may not demand their products); soon enough
Russian culture will again take its rightful place among other
West European cultures in Hungary; soon enough the interest in
the Russian language will resurface on a voluntary and, indeed,
necessary basis. He reacted against what he saw as an unfortunate turn to (Western, U.S.?) pop culture and lamented its dominance over “genuine” European (including Russian) culture. He
persists with admirable energy (and despite huge financial difficulties) in advancing the cause of Russian culture in Budapest.
231
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By persuasion and cultural commitment, Vyshinskii has managed to bring top Russian artists to Hungary — often without
paying them any honoraria. His strategy for displaying Russian
culture goes under the rubric “The Unknown Russia” and
includes church art, the Russian province, Finno-Ugric culture
(from formerly closed Soviet border areas and of special interest
to Hungarians eager to trace their ethnic roots), traditional
applied arts, performances by young Russian musicians, or
exhibitions of advanced Russian hi-tech achievements. In addition, the center supports modest Russian language programs.
The center’s activities are aimed at counteracting the fixation on
Western pop culture with true Russian artistic achievement. The
irony in this strategy lies in the fact that (in the words of Vyshinskii) “Russia has never not been a part of Europe.” The emphasis
on Hungarian origins builds on historic-geographical commonalities, and a strong dosage of the unknown Russia will presumably cure the “allergy” to the known (Soviet?) Russia. Not only
the Hungarians, but the Russians too, reject their communist
past and look West.
VII. Carnivalesque Signs
Szobor Park is a peculiar mixture of concentrated socialist realism, Hungarian suburbia, and Western tourist nostalgia for a
lost communist exoticism. As one of these tourists, I visited the
park with American colleagues. We enjoyed the mixed signals
sent by the very idea of the park and its actual function. “There
is joy in the absence of bookburning,” according to the blueprint
plans cited in the museum catalogue. A sense of joyous theatricality indeed gripped us, and we found irreverent posing irresistible — crushed under the boot of the forward-striving
socialist hero, or dwarfed by the Stakhanovite determination of
huge marching workers. We rejoiced in the absence of statue
destruction, in being able to mock and play with a defeated ideology of positive heroes and “Single Path” social solutions
accompanied by enforced cheers.
A young Hungarian teacher related a similar reaction to the
past among Hungarian students. Their euphoria over the 1989
victory over communism also carnivalized the old signifiers of
the victory of communism: at a mock celebration of the major
232
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Soviet-era holiday — the Great October — students burst into old
Komsomol songs, reversing their original spirit by irreverent
laughter. Such carnivalesque laughter in its sacrilege and
ambivalence is liberating.
The blueprint plans for Szobor Park stress that the park’s
design “aimed to break through the mine field of objections, to
achieve an accurate, correct presentation of the statues, free
from any sense of barely-concealed mockery—this is not a ‘jokepark’, it is absolutely not that.” There is an odd contradiction
between the declared response of “joy” and the self-imposed
refusal to “joke,” as if joking, laughter, and merriment were not
an acceptable means of coming to terms with the past. The park
is tastefully and “seriously” built, but can the public response to
it be dictated?
The fear of irreverence, mockery, or ridicule, can be encountered among Russians as well as Hungarians. Vyshinskii dismissed it as a zverinets (zoo, menagerie) and an unacceptable
debasement of history. Educated Hungarians also dismissed the
park. Szobor Park is perhaps an extreme example of the ambivalence of signs in transition-era Hungary, a collection of official
art with a new function, of “correct” high socialist realism both
displayed and turned on its head, of kitschy contextualization
and marginalization of the center, of uncrowned kings. To a
Western foreigner, laughter is only the initial spontaneous
response to a situation one cannot ever enter into as an insider
who had to live through the tragic consequences of the discredited ideology. Carnivalization is fully meaningful only to those
inside the culture being carnivalized. To transition-era Hungarians, that culture is still painful. Pain is not conducive to laughter, and looking West is the less painful solution. Perhaps
liberating laughter can return when the pain of transition subsides.
Forbidden laughter is not, however, solely a Hungarian or a
Russian phenomenon. As I contemplate how much (serious)
Hungarian history the park taught me despite the urge to carnivalize the experience, I do not see a necessary contradiction
between utile and dulce. Our Hungarian learning experience
gave us some “serious” understanding both of the joys and sorrows of transition and globalization. At the same time, we had a
lot of fun, we laughed a lot together and with Hungarian col233
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leagues! Why is it then, that in trying to convey the experience to
American colleagues, some sort of an internal censor prompts
me to emphasize the utile and downplay the dulce? Why is it that
I feel just the slightest bit guilty for the fun I had?
Notes
1. István Örkény, One Minute Stories, trans. Judith Sollosy (Budapest: Corvina,
1994): 97 – 98.
2. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984).
3. Aleksandr Blok, Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 1 (Moscow, Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1955): 453 – 55. That this issue is still alive in today’s Westward
looking Russia is seen, for instance, in V. Belopol’skaia’s review (Ogonek 23
[June 1995]: 68 – 69) of the recent Vladimir Khotinenko film Musul’manin (The
Moslem [man]), which cites Blok’s lines in summarizing the essence of the
Russian character as presented in the film.
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